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Under-reaction in the Sovereign CDS Market 
 
Abstract 
 
The sovereign CDS market has been growing rapidly in recent years, with a gross notional 
amount of around 2 trillion dollars in 2015. We document a strong momentum effect in this 
market. Its unique feature is that this momentum strategy returns are positively skewed and 
higher during recessions. Hence, this effect cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk or 
exposure to business cycles. Our evidence is consistent with the interpretation that the effect is 
due to investors’ initial underreaction to sovereign credit information followed by corrections, 
especially during public announcements of credit rating or outlook changes of the underlying 
countries.  
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I. Introduction 
A sovereign CDS contract allows market participants to purchase or sell protection against the 
default risk of a sovereign government. The sovereign CDS market has been growing rapidly in 
the past decade. According to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, the aggregate 
notional amount of sovereign CDS contracts is around $2 trillion in 2015. Our paper examines 
the momentum strategy in this large and fast-growing market, and its potential causes.  
Given the extensive momentum literature since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), why is it 
worthwhile examining this phenomenon in yet another market? In addition to the fact that the 
sovereign CDS market is enormous and fast growing, this market has two unique features that 
separate our study from the rest of the literature. First, the investors in this market are almost 
exclusively sophisticated financial institutions. Hence, one might expect that these institutions 
are less subject to behavioral biases, since it is not obvious whether individual biases would 
manifest themselves in the decision making of sophisticated institutions. Many prior studies 
mostly focus on stock markets, where naïve investors are expected to be more prevalent.1 Even 
in derivative markets and currency markets, retail investors can be quite active. Hence, by 
focusing on a market with sophisticated institutions, our paper sheds new light on the momentum 
literature. Indeed, as explained in detail later, the sovereign CDS momentum returns display 
several unique features relative to all those documented in other markets.  
Second, the information structure in the sovereign CDS market helps shed light on the 
mechanism behind the momentum effect in this market. As summarized in Barberis and Thaler 
(2003), behavioral models of momentum can be classified along two dimensions: the 
information structure and the cause of momentum. Along the information structure dimension: a 
                                                          
1 According French (2008), direct holdings account for half of the U.S. stock market in the 1980s. Even though 
direct holdings have been declining, it still accounts for more than 20% in 2007.   
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key distinction is whether the information in the model is public or private. In the sovereign CDS 
market, the main information is about macro-level variables (e.g., the creditworthiness of 
sovereign governments). Hence, most of the information is arguably publicly available. Given 
the sophistication of the investors in this market, it is perhaps reasonable to expect most of them 
to have the capacity to process the information. Hence, models based on public information (e.g., 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and De Long et al. (1990)) perhaps are more suitable for 
explaining the momentum phenomenon in the sovereign CDS market. Moreover, as explained in 
detail later, our evidence on the properties of the momentum returns can help further distinguish 
models along the second dimension (i.e., the cause of momentum) and shed further light on the 
mechanism behind the momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market.  
We obtain sovereign CDS market data on 91 countries during 2001 to 2015. Following 
Berndt and Obreja (2010), we construct the monthly sovereign “CDS returns,” which effectively 
measure the sovereign CDS market implied excess returns from the exposure to the underlying 
sovereign credit risk. Our main findings are the following. 
First, we document a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market. Specifically, 
we sort countries into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. Quintile-1 
countries have the highest sovereign CDS returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved the most 
according to the sovereign CDS market, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest sovereign 
CDS returns. We find strong evidence that the sovereign CDS of quintile-1 countries continue to 
outperform that of quintile-5 countries. In particular, we form an equal-weighted portfolio of 
sovereign CDS for each quintile. During the first month after the sorting, the quintile-1 portfolio 
outperforms the quintile-5 portfolio by 0.58% per month (t=3.18). After accounting for the 
exposures to the sovereign CDS market return factor and the global value and momentum factors 
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in Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013), the long-short strategy return is still 0.55% per 
month (t=3.20).  
One might be concerned that the above momentum returns are driven mostly by CDS 
contracts that are on small economies and not actively traded. Without detailed data on the total 
size of the outstanding sovereign CDS contracts for each country, however, we form GDP-
weighted sovereign CDS portfolios to give lower weights to smaller economies and the resulting 
momentum returns remain very similar. We also find that the sovereign CDS momentum effect 
is robust for various sorting periods and holding periods. For example, for the one-month holding 
period, the long-short portfolio return is 0.46% per month (t=2.67) and 0.45% per month (t=2.81) 
when the sorting period is one month and six months, respectively. The long-short return only 
gradually becomes insignificant when the holding period becomes longer than 6 months.  
Second, in contrast to the evidence on the momentum effect in other markets, sovereign 
CDS momentum returns are positively skewed and higher during recessions. For instance, for the 
strategy with a three-month sorting period and a one-month holding period, the skewness of the 
long-short return is 2.94 (t=2.92). Moreover, the average return during the two recessions in our 
sample is 1.43% per month, while that for the non-recession period is only 0.41% per month, 
with the t-statistic for the return difference being 2.24. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum 
returns cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk (Daniel and Moskowitz (2016)) or the 
exposure to the business cycle (Asness, Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz (2014)).  
Third, consistent with the interpretation that the sovereign CDS momentum is due to 
underreaction, the average momentum strategy return increases with the holding period, and that 
there appears to be no reversal. For instance, the cumulative alpha is 0.55% (t=3.20), 1.11% 
(t=3.04), and 1.50% (t=2.47) if the holding period is 1, 3, and 6 months, respectively. The 
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cumulative alpha gradually loses statistical significance when the holding period further 
increases. This evidence is consistent with the interpretation of initial under-reaction followed by 
correction. There is no evidence of overreaction.  
Fourth, the timing of the sovereign CDS momentum returns is consistent with the 
interpretation that the sovereign CDS market underreacts to the information on the 
creditworthiness of the underlying countries and the momentum strategy generates profits when 
this undereraction is eventually corrected. When should the correction happen? A natural 
conjecture is perhaps when the sovereign credit information becomes public, i.e., when credit 
rating or outlook changes are announced. This conjecture implies that the sovereign CDS 
momentum strategy should be more profitable around the time when credit rating agencies, such 
as the Standard & Poor’s, announce changes in credit ratings or outlooks. Indeed, our estimates 
show that the profit of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy is accrued mostly during those 
announcement months. We further separately analyze the profit from the long and short legs of 
the momentum strategy, and find that the momentum profit is from both legs. The profit from the 
short leg (i.e., buying protections) is concentrated almost entirely during announcement months. 
In contrast, the profit from the long leg is distributed more evenly across time. That is, while 
good news (i.e., upgrade in outlook or rating) tends to be incorporated into sovereign CDS 
spreads gradually, bad news tends to be incorporated in sovereign CDS spreads more abruptly 
around announcements.   
Fifth, we decompose sovereign CDS returns into a global component and a country-
specific component, and find that both components contribute to the momentum returns. This 
test is motivated by the evidence in Xiao, Yan, and Zhang (2018) that sovereign CDS returns can 
predict future stock index returns, sovereign bond yields, as well real macroeconomic variables 
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such as GDP and PMI, and that the predictive power is almost entirely from the global, rather 
than country-specific, component of sovereign CDS returns. However, our evidence suggests 
that both components have predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns in the cross-
section, and hence contribute to the momentum effect. 
Finally, we follow Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) to analyze the time-series 
momentum in the sovereign CDS market. We find significant time-series momentum returns for 
various sorting and holding periods, although their economic magnitude is much smaller relative 
to that of cross-sectional momentum strategies. For example, for a 3-month sorting period and a 
1-month holding period, the time series momentum return is 0.19% per month (t=2.93), which is 
less than one third of the return from a similar cross-sectional momentum strategy.  
As pointed in Barberis and Thaler (2003), behavioral models of momentum can be 
classified by the two causes of momentum: initial under-reaction followed by correction and 
initial overreaction followed by even more overreaction. Those models can also be classified by 
the two information structure: models with public information and models with private 
information. Hence, one can classify the four major behavioral models as follows: Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) is based on public information and underreaction, while De Long et 
al. (1990) is based on public information and overreaction. Both Hong and Stein (1999) and 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyan (1998) are based on private information. The former is 
based on underreaction while that latter overreaction. As argued earlier, public information likely 
plays a more dominant role in the sovereign CDS market. Hence, our evidence on underreaction 
suggests that the sovereign CDS momentum is perhaps better described by the model in Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).  
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Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), there has been a vast literature on momentum, which 
is too large to be summarized in detail here, and has been surveyed in multiple studies (see, e.g., 
Asness et al 2014). The literature has examined momentum for a variety of markets, such as 
corporate bonds, loans, and CDSs (e.g., Jostova et al. (2013), Beyhaghi and Ehsani (2017), and 
Lee et al. (2014)), stock indices (e.g., Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006) and Richards (1997)), 
futures markets (e.g., Asness et al. (2014) and Moskowitz et al. (2012)), currency markets 
(Menkhoff et al. (2012)), and sport betting markets (Moskowitz (2016)). Our paper complements 
this literature by analyzing a market where public information plays a dominant role and 
investors are primarily sophisticated financial institutions. Moreover, the momentum literature 
often focuses on micro-level information, our paper adds to this literature by focusing on macro 
information. The unique features of sovereign CDS momentum are that sovereign CDS 
momentum returns are positively skewed and higher during recessions. These features make it 
more challenging to attribute the momentum returns to arbitrageurs concerns of crash risk and 
exposures to business cycles.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data used in this 
study. The main analysis is presented in Section III, and Section IV concludes. 
II. Data 
In the sovereign CDS market, investors can purchase or sell protections against the default risk 
of sovereign governments. 2 During the term of a sovereign CDS contract, the buyer makes 
quarterly payments, which are often referred to as CDS coupons or spreads, to the seller in 
exchange for the seller’s promise of protection. The sovereign CDS spreads are paid on the 20th 
day of March, June, September and December. If a credit event occurs, the protection buyer will 
                                                          
2 See Augustin et al (2018) for more details on the sovereign CDS market.  
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be compensated by the loss at the credit event. Credit events include failure to pay, moratorium, 
obligation acceleration, and restructuring. The occurrence of a credit event is determined by the 
ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees. In most cases, sovereign CDSs are settled 
by cash with an auction process, in which the CDS seller makes a cash payment based on an 
auction-generated market price of certain eligible debt obligation of the sovereign government. 
An alternative is the “physical settlement”, in which the protection buyers tender an eligible 
bond to the sellers and receive the par value of the bond. The market for sovereign CDS has been 
growing rapidly in the past decades. According to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, 
the aggregate notional amount of sovereign CDS contracts is around $2 trillion in 2015, 
accounting for around 15% of all credit derivatives. 
Our sovereign CDS data are from the Markit Group, which collects daily sovereign CDS 
quotation data from major CDS dealers to construct average CDS spreads. We focus on US 
dollar denominated CDS contracts with a five-year maturity and default tier being the senior 
unsecured debt, as these contracts are most widely traded and have the highest market liquidity. 
Our sample is from January 2001 to September 2015. There are 29 countries with active 
sovereign CDS contracts in our sample in 2001. This number has been increasing steadily and is 
91 by 2015. In the appendix, we list all the countries in our sample, and the starting time of the 
sovereign CDS data for each country.  
We follow Berndt and Obreja (2010) to construct the monthly sovereign “CDS returns.” 
Specifically, the “return” of a CDS contract during a month is computed as the ratio of the mark-
to-the-market profit/loss during the month to the notional amount, where the mark-to-the-market 
profit/loss is computed from the perspective of the protection seller, and is estimated based on 
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the widely used ISDA CDS model.3 As pointed out in Berndt and Obreja (2010), this return 
effectively measures the sovereign CDS market implied excess returns from exposures to the 
underlying sovereign credit risk. As argued in Longstaff et al (2011), there are a number of 
advantages in using the sovereign CDS data to estimate sovereign credit spreads, relative to 
directly using sovereign debt data. Note that, according to this definition of sovereign CDS 
returns, as the underlying country’s creditworthiness improves, its sovereign CDS returns 
increases. That is, a high sovereign CDS return is “good news” about the underlying country’s 
creditworthiness.  
We follow Xiao, Yan and Zhang (2018) to measure the monthly CDS returns based on 
the CDS spreads on the 20th of a month and on the 19th of the next month to make sure that the 
CDSs on these two dates have the same expiration date. Specifically, there are four coupon 
payment dates, the so-called IMM dates, each year: March 20, June 20, September 20 and 
December 20. All CDS contracts initiated between two IMM dates expire on the same day. After 
each IMM date, however, contracts with a new maturity date start trading. These new contracts 
are said to be “on-the-run” until the next IMM date. Our sovereign CDS data are based on on-
the-run contracts. Hence, a contract on the 20th of a month and a contract on the 19th of the next 
month always expire on the same day.4 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sovereign CDS data. The average CDS spread 
is 241 bps with a standard deviation of 556 bps. The monthly sovereign CDS return has a mean 
of 0.02% and a standard deviation of 2.59%.  
 
                                                          
3 See O’Kane (2008) for more details. To implement this valuation model, we assume a constant hazard 
rate and a 40% recovery rate, and use the LIBOR term structure as the discount rates. 
4 As a counter example, a contract on the 15th of a month and a contract on the 14th of the next month do 
not always have the same expiration date. For example, a contract on March 15 and a contract on April 14 
have different expiration dates. 
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III. Empirical Results 
A. Cross-sectional momentum 
We sort countries into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. 
Quintile-1 countries have the highest returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved the most 
according to the sovereign CDS market, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest sovereign 
CDS returns. Then, we form equal weighted portfolios of sovereign CDS contracts for each 
quintile. The portfolio returns during the first month after this sorting are reported in Panel A of 
Table 2.  
The average return of the winner portfolio (quintile 1) is 0.26% per month, while that of 
the loser portfolio (quintile 5) is -0.32% per month. That is, the winner portfolio, on average, 
outperforms the loser one by 0.58% per month, or 6.96% per year, with a t-statistic of 3.18. 
Hence, our evidence suggests a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market.  
To account the risk factors in the existing literature, we regress the long-short strategy 
returns on a number of factors. The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 2. For the 
regression in the first column, we include the market factor, which is constructed as the monthly 
equally-weighted sovereign CDS portfolio. The resulting alpha is 0.58% per month (t = 3.61) 
and is almost the same as the original average long-short return. In the second column, we also 
include the global value and momentum factors from Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013), 
and the momentum alpha is 0.55% per month (t=3.20) in this specification.  
One might be concerned that the above momentum returns are driven mostly by CDS 
contracts that are on small economies and not actively traded. Without detailed data on the total 
size of the outstanding sovereign CDS contracts for each country, however, we form GDP-
weighted sovereign CDS portfolios to give lower weights to smaller economies. As shown in the 
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third row of Panel A, the results based on GDP-weighted portfolios remain very similar. For 
example, the long-short portfolio return is 0.60% per month (t=2.46). Moreover, we regress this 
GDP-weighted long-short strategy return on the previously mentioned factors. As shown in 
columns three and four of Panel B, the alpha is 0.61% per month (t=2.75) when we account for 
the market factor, and is 0.50% per month (t=2.33) when we also add the global value and 
momentum factors. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum effect is not mostly driven by very 
small economies. 
We conducted a number of subsample analyses. As shown in the first two rows of Panel 
C, the average momentum return is 0.54% (t=2.70) and 0.61% (t=2.16) in the first and second 
halves of our sample, respectively. We also split our sample according to the development status 
of the underlying countries. Specifically, we partition our sample into a subsample of developing 
economies and one for developed economies, based on the classification by the International 
Monetary Fund.5 As shown in the third and fourth rows, the average sovereign CDS momentum 
return is 0.41% (t=2.29) and 0.66% per month (t=2.32) for the developed and developing 
economy subsamples, respectively.  
The above analysis is based on a three-month sorting period and a one-month holding 
period. To examine the robustness of those results, we repeat the analysis by varying the sorting 
and holding periods. As shown in the first row of Panel D, where the holding period is one 
month, the momentum alpha remains similar when the sorting period varies from one to six 
months. When the holding period increases to six months, as shown in the first three rows, the 
magnitude of the momentum alpha decreases gradually, but remains statistically significant.  
When we further increase the holding period to 12 months, the alpha gradually decreases and 
becomes statistically insignificant. 
                                                          
5 See, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/groups.htm. 
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B. Unique features of sovereign CDS momentum returns 
The sovereign CDS momentum returns appear unique relative to the momentum returns 
in other markets. First, sovereign CDS returns are positively skewed. As noted in and Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016), the momentum strategy returns across many asset classes are subject to 
infrequent but significant crashes. They document momentum cashes in all the markets in their 
sample, which include four equity markets, index futures, commodity, fixed income, as well as 
currency. Chabot, Ghysels, and Jagannathan (2014) document momentum crashes during the 
pre-CRSP period for both the US and the UK stock markets. In contrast, the skewness of the 
momentum returns in our sample is 2.94 (t=2.92). That is, this momentum strategy appears to 
have infrequent but large gains, rather than losses. Unlike the momentum strategies in other 
markets, the momentum strategy in the sovereign CDS market appears not exposed to crash risk 
in our sample.   
Note that, during our sample period, there are a number of credit events, which lead to 
large negative sovereign CDS returns. One might be concerned that the previously reported mean 
and skewness of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy returns are mostly driven by those 
extreme returns. However, due to our large sample size, those observations have only small 
effects on the mean and skewness of sovereign CDS momentum returns. For example, we repeat 
our analysis after excluding those extreme returns in our sample. The resulting mean and 
skewness of sovereign CDS momentum returns remain similar.  
Second, the sovereign CDS momentum strategy appears to perform better during 
recessions. Asness et al. (2014) find that momentum strategies tend to perform worse during 
recessions, especially for the strategies based on non-stock asset classes. Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2016) also find that momentum strategies tend to have poor performances during bad times. For 
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example, momentum crashes tend occur in panic states, following market declines and when 
market volatility is high. To examine the cyclicality of the sovereign CDS momentum returns, 
we plot the cumulative return from the momentum strategy over time for strategies with various 
sorting periods in Figure 1. MOM (6,1) refers to the cumulative return from the strategy with a 
six-month sorting period and a one-month holding period. MOM (1,1) and MOM (3,1) are 
defined similarly. The two shaded areas correspond to the NBER recessions in the U.S. The 
striking pattern of the figure is that the momentum strategy returns tend to increase significantly 
during the two recessions.  
To test this more formally, we analyze the returns of these three strategies during the 
recession and non-recession sample periods. As shown in Panel E of Table 2, the average return 
for strategy MOM (3,1) is 1.43% during the two recessions, and is only 0.41% during the rest of 
our sample.  The t-statistic for the difference between the two average returns is 2.24. Similarly, 
the momentum strategy outperforms during recessions for both MOM(1,1) and MOM (6,1). For 
example, the mean return for strategy MOM (6,1) is 1.71% and 0.25% per month during the 
recession and non-recession periods, respectively. The performance difference is 1.47% per 
month, with a t-statistic of 3.14.  
C. Interpretation 
As summarized in Barberis and Thaler (2003), behavioral models of momentum can be 
classified by the two causes of momentum: initial underreaction followed by correction and 
initial overreaction followed by even more overreaction. If the momentum strategy return is due 
to overreaction, the alpha of the momentum trading strategy should revert back towards zero 
when the holding period is increased. On the other hand, if the momentum return is due to 
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underreaction followed by correction, the alpha of the momentum strategy should increase with 
the holding period, and eventually stabilize.  
To distinguish these two interpretations, we examine the alphas of the momentum 
strategy for longer holding periods. In particular, we compute the alphas the long-short strategies 
based on a three-month sorting period and various holding periods. As shown in Panel D of 
Table 2, the cumulative alpha during the holding period is 0.55%, 1.11% (=0.37%×3), and 1.50% 
(=0.25%×6) if the holding period is 1, 3, and 6 months, respectively. The alpha gradually loses 
statistical significance when the holding period increases further. We plot this holding period 
cumulative alpha against the holding period in Figure 2, which shows that the holding period 
alpha increases with the holding period, and the increase slows down after 3 months. There is no 
sign of reversion back towards zero when we further increase the holding period, although the 
alpha becomes statistically insignificant when the holding period is longer than 9 months. This is 
consistent with the underreaction interpretation that sovereign CDS market gradually 
incorporates information into prices and there is no evidence of overshooting. 
C.1. Timing of momentum profits 
What is the information that sovereign CDS market underreacts to? A natural candidate is 
perhaps the sovereign creditworthiness. The momentum strategy generates profits when this 
undereraction is eventually corrected. When should the correction happen, so that sovereign CDS 
spreads “catch up” with reality? A natural conjecture is perhaps when that sovereign credit 
information becomes public, i.e., when credit rating or outlook changes are publically announced. 
This conjecture implies that the sovereign CDS momentum strategy should be more profitable 
around the time when credit rating agencies, such as the Standard & Poor’s, announce changes in 
credit ratings or outlooks. 
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To test this implication, we first construct an indicator variable Iit, which is 1 if country i 
is in quintile 1 according to the sorting by sovereign CDS returns during months t-2 to t (i.e., the 
sovereign CDS market indicates that the creditworthiness of country i improved the most during 
the recent three months), is -1 if country i is in quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other three 
quintiles.  
The momentum effect implies that this indicator variable Ii,t should predict future 
sovereign CDS returns. We confirm this by regressing ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS on 
country i in month t, on Ii,t-1, with country fixed effects and month fixed effects. As shown in the 
first column of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient of Ii,t-1 is 0.21 (t=2.47). This estimate reflects 
the momentum effect analyzed previously: the monthly sovereign CDS returns of the countries 
in the top (bottom) quintile, which is sorted based on the previous 3 month CDS returns, is 21 
basis points higher (lower) than that of the middle 3 quintiles.  
We can now test the implication that the momentum strategy should be more profitable 
around the time when credit rating or outlook changes are announced. Specifically, we construct 
a dummy variable Dit, which is 1 if there is a credit rating or outlook change on country i in 
month t by Standard & Poor’s, and 0 otherwise. We then regress ri,t, the return of the sovereign 
CDS on country i in month t, on the interaction term between Iit-1 and Dit. Our prediction that 
sovereign CDS momentum strategy should be more profitable during announcement months 
implies that the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive. 
Indeed, as shown in the second column of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient of the 
interaction term Iit-1×Dit is 1.42 (t=3.24). Note that the coefficient of Iit-1 is 0.10 (t=1.31). Hence, 
the coefficient of the interaction term is more than 14 times the coefficient for Iit-1. That is, the 
predictive power of Iit-1 is more than 14 times stronger during announcement months than during 
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other periods. When there is a public announcement of credit rating or outlook change, which 
has been partially anticipated by the sovereign CDS market, the creditworthiness information is 
more fully incorporated into prices. As a result, the sovereign CDS momentum profit is 14 times 
stronger during credit-event months than during other periods. This timing of the sovereign CDS 
momentum returns is consistent with the interpretation of under-reaction followed by correction. 
C.2. Long and short legs 
We separately analyze the profit from the long and short legs of the momentum strategy. 
Specifically, we construct two dummy variables I_Goodi,t and I_Badi,t, where I_Goodi,t (I_Badi,t) 
is set to 1 if country i is in quintile 1 (5) according to the sorting by sovereign CDS returns 
during months t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. We then regress ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS 
of country i in month t, on I_Goodi,t-1 and I_Badi,t-1, with country fixed effects and month fixed 
effects. As shown in the first column of Panel B of Table 3, the coefficient of I_Goodi,t-1 is 0.24 
(t=2.38). That is, the sovereign CDSs of quintile-1 countries outperform those of quintiles 2 
through 4 by 0.24% per month. Similarly, the coefficient of I_Badi,t-1, is -0.18 (t=1.78), which 
suggests that the sovereign CDSs of quintile-5 countries underperform those of quintiles 2 
through 4 by 0.18% per month. That is, both the long and short legs of the strategy contribute to 
the momentum profits.  
To further examine the timing of the momentum profits from the long and short legs, we 
include the interaction terms between these two dummy variables and the credit event dummy Dit. 
As shown in the second column of Panel B, the coefficient of I_Badi,t-1, is 0.00 (t=0.00), while 
that of the interaction term I_Badi,t-1×Dit is -2.59 (t=3.18).  That is, the profit from the short leg is 
concentrated almost entirely during announcement months. In contrast, the coefficient of 
I_Goodi,t-1 is 0.21 (t=2.02), while the coefficient of I_Goodi,t-1×Dit is insignificant. That is, the 
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profit from the long leg is distributed more evenly across time. In other words, while the 
underreaction to good news (i.e., upgrades in outlook or rating) tends to be corrected gradually 
over time, the underrection to bad news tends to be corrected more abruptly around the 
announcements.  
As summarized in Barberis and Thaler (2003), there are two prominent models of 
momentum based on underreaction: Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein 
(1999). The former is based on public information while the latter private information. The most 
important information in the sovereign CDS market is perhaps the information about macro 
variables, such as the credit worthiness of sovereign countries. Arguably most of the information 
in this market is public. Moreover, investors in this market are mostly sophisticated financial 
institutions. Hence, it is perhaps reasonable to expect most of them to be able to process the 
information. Therefore, our evidence suggests that the sovereign CDS momentum effect is 
perhaps better described by a public information based model, such as Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998).  
D. Global vs. local information 
Xiao, Yan, and Zhang (2018) find that sovereign CDS returns can predict future stock 
index returns, sovereign bond yields, as well real macroeconomic variables such as GDP and 
PMI. Interestingly, they find that the predictive power is almost entirely from the global, rather 
than country-specific, component of sovereign CDS returns. Motivated by these results, we 
decompose sovereign CDS returns into a global component and a country-specific component by 
a simple market model, and examine which component contributes to the momentum effect, i.e., 
has the predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns.  
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The return decomposition is based on a 12-month rolling window regression of CDS 
returns on the market factor, which is constructed as the average sovereign CDS returns across 
all countries in our sample. For each sovereign CDs contract, we regress its return on the market 
factor. The regression residuals are classified as the country-specific component of sovereign 
CDS return. The remaining portion of the sovereign CDS returns is classified as the global 
component.  
Which component has predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns? To analyze 
this, we first repeat our portfolio sorting analysis in Tables 2, using the two components as the 
sorting variables. That is, we first sort countries into 5 quintiles based on the global component 
of sovereign CDS returns. Quintile-1 countries have the highest global component of sovereign 
CDS returns in the previous three months, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest global 
component returns. We then form equal weighted portfolios of sovereign CDS contracts for each 
quintile. The portfolio returns during the first month after the sorting are reported in the first row 
of Panel A of Table 4. It shows that the quintile-1 portfolio outperforms the quintile-5 portfolio 
by 0.44% (t=2.64) per month. Similarly, we sort countries by the country-specific component of 
sovereign CDS returns. In this case, as shown in the second row, the quintile-1 portfolio 
outperforms the quintile-5 one by 0.30% (t=2.00) per month. As a comparison, the last row 
reports the portfolio results when the sorting variable is the total sovereign CDS return for the 
same sample period as those for the previous two rows. In this case, the long-short return is 0.52% 
(t=3.21) per month.  
We also control for the same risk factors as those in Table 2. As shown in the last column 
of Panel A of Table 4, the resulting alphas are almost the same as the original long-short returns. 
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Hence, our evidence suggests that both the global and the country-specific components of 
sovereign CDS returns can predict future CDS returns. 
We further examine this predictability in panel regressions. Specifically, we extend the 
analysis in Panel A of Table 3 by replacing the indicator variable Ii,t by I_SYSi,t and I_IDIOi,t. 
Similar to the definition of Ii,t, I_SYSi,t is 1 if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting by 
the global component of sovereign CDS returns during months t-2 to t, is -1 if country i is in 
quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other three quintiles. The indicator variable I_IDIOi,t  is 
based on the country-specific component of sovereign CDS returns, and is defined similarly. 
To examine the marginal predictive power of I_SYSit and I_IDIOit, we regress rit, the 
return of the sovereign CDS on country i in month t on I_SYSi,t-1 and I_IDIOi,t-1, with country 
fixed effects and month fixed effects. As shown in the first column of Panel B of Table 4, the 
coefficients of I_SYSi,t-1 is 0.22 (t=2.25), which reflects the marginal predictive power of the 
global component of sovereign CDS returns. Everything else being equal, the monthly sovereign 
CDS returns of the countries in the top (bottom) quintile, which is sorted based on the global 
component of sovereign CDS returns during the previous 3 months, is 22 basis point higher 
(lower) than that of the middle 3 quintiles. Similarly, the coefficient of I_IDIOi,t-1 is 0.14 (t=2.25). 
Hence, both the global and country-specific components have marginal predictive power for 
future sovereign CDS returns, although the magnitude of the predictability of the country-
specific component is smaller.   
Finally, we also include the interaction terms between credit event dummy Di,t and the 
two indicator variables I_SYSi,t-1 and I_IDIOi,t-1. As shown in the second column of Panel B, the 
coefficient I_IDIOi,t-1×Dit is 1.42 (t=3.30). Note that the coefficient of I_IDIOi,t-1 is 0.019 
(t=0.36). Hence, the profit from the long-short strategy based on the country-specific component 
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of sovereign CDS returns is almost entirely concentrated around credit event months. That is, the 
underreaction to country-specific information is mostly corrected during announcement months. 
However, this is not the case for the long-short portfolio based on the global component. The 
coefficient of I_SYSi,t-1×Dit is statistically insignificant. Hence, the profit from the long-short 
strategy based on the global component of sovereign CDS returns is more dispersed over time. In 
the other words, the correction to the underreaction to the global information is more gradual 
over time.   
E. Time series momentum 
Following Moskowitz et al. (2012), we also investigate the time series momentum, which 
is related to, but different from the above cross-sectional momentum. The cross-sectional 
momentum return is due to the fact that securities, which outperformed (underperformed) their 
peers recently, tend to continue outperforming (underperforming) their peers in the coming 
months. In contrast, the time-series momentum strategy is to buy securities with positive past 
returns and sell the securities with negative past returns. That is, the time series momentum 
strategy is constructed based on each security’s own past returns, and there is no cross-sectional 
comparison across assets. Moskowitz et al. (2012) find that there is significant time series 
momentum returns in equity index, currency, commodity, and bond futures.  
We sort countries into two groups based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. 
Group 1 consists of countries with negative sovereign CDS returns during the previous 3 months 
while group 2 consists of countries with positive ones. Then, we form an equal-weighted 
portfolio that is long in sovereign CDSs on group-2 countries and short in those on group-1 
countries. For the one-month holding period, as shown in the first row of Table 5, the average 
return of this long-short strategy is 0.19% per month (t=2.93). Although the time-series 
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momentum strategy return is statistically significant, its magnitude is less than one third of that 
of the corresponding cross-sectional momentum strategy.   
We repeat the above analysis by varying the sorting period from one to 12 months. As 
shown in the first row of Table 5, the time series momentum return remains significant when the 
sorting period is between one to nine months. We also vary the holding period from one to 12 
months. As shown in Table 5, the average long-short strategy return is significantly positive 
when the holding period is up to 6 months, and gradually become statistically insignificant when 
we further increase the holding period.  
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has documented a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market. In 
contrast to the evidence in other financial markets, the sovereign CDS momentum returns are 
positively skewed, and higher during recessions. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum returns 
cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk or the exposure to business cycles. Our evidence is 
consistent with the interpretation that the sovereign CDS momentum is due to investors’ initial 
underreaction to public macro information followed by corrections, especially when there are 
public announcements on credit rating or outlook changes. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of CDS spread and CDS return. CDS spread is the daily 
sovereign CDS spread, and is from Markit. CDS return is computed from the CDS spreads on the 20th of 
a month and on the 19th of the next month. The monthly sovereign CDS return is computed as the ratio of 
the mark-to-the-market profit/loss during the month to the notional amount, where the mark-to-the-market 
profit/loss is computed from the perspective of the protection seller, and is estimated based on the ISDA 
CDS model, where the hazard rate is a constant and the recovery rate is 40%, and the discount rates are 
from the LIBOR term structure. 
 
  Mean Std Dev 1st 25th 50th 75th 99th N 
CDS spread (bps) 240.56 555.71 1.74 36.66 119.28 276.43 1960.15 12193 
CDS return (%) 0.02 2.59 -7.83 -0.22 0.01 0.37 6.64 12065 
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Table 2. Cross-sectional Momentum  
Countries are sorted into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. Quintile 1 (5) 
countries have the highest (lowest) CDS returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved (deteriorated) the 
most. Then, for each quintile, we form an equal weighted or GDP weighted portfolio of sovereign CDSs 
and compute its return for the next month. Panel A reports the average return of each quintile portfolio, 
and the long-short portfolio that is long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5. Panel B reports the results 
from the regression of the monthly returns of the long-short portfolios on various factors. MKT is the 
monthly return of the equal-weighted portfolio of all sovereign CDSs. VAL and MOM are the global 
value and momentum factors in Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013), and are obtained from the AQR 
data library. Panel C reports the portfolio results based on subsamples. The first and send rows are based 
on the sample period 2001 through 2007, and 2008 through 2015, respectively. The third and fourth rows 
are based on, respectively, the subsamples of developed and developing economies, which are defined by 
the IMF. Panel D reports the results based on various sorting and holding periods. Panel E reports the 
average return of the long-short portfolio during the NBER-recession and non-recession periods. 
MOM(n,h) refers to the portfolio with a n-month sorting period and h-month holding period. The t-
statistics for skewness are based on bootstrapped standard errors. All other t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags. All t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Momentum returns in the sovereign CDS market 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1-P5 
  (high)    (low)  
Equal weight Mean (%) 0.26* 0.08 -0.00 -0.00 -0.32 0.58*** 
  (1.88) (1.04) (-0.03) (0.02) (1.42) (3.18) 
 Skewness 1.61** 0.38 -1.87 -1.64 -3.21** 2.94*** 
  (2.04) (-0.82) (-1.87) (-0.90) (-2.69) (2.92) 
GDP weight Mean (%) 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.42* 0.60** 
  (1.17) (0.85) (0.46) (0.31) (1.70) (2.46) 
 Skewness 0.09 0.13 0.73 1.98 4.47** 3.30* 
  (0.22) (0.29) (0.92) (0.84) (2.33) (1.92) 
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Panel B.  Sovereign CDS momentum alphas (%) 
  
Equal-weighted 
Returns 
Equal-weighted 
Returns 
GDP-Weighted 
Returns 
GDP-Weighted 
Returns 
Alpha 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.61*** 0.50** 
 (3.61) (3.20) (2.75) (2.33) 
MKT -0.83* 0.89** 1.21* 1.31** 
 
(1.90) (2.11) (1.91) (2.25) 
VAL  0.25 
 0.56** 
 
 (1.39)  (2.05) 
MOM  -0.01 
 0.07 
 
 (0.08)  (0.42) 
   
  
Observations 175 175 175 175 
R-Square 0.1346 0.1550 0.1593 0.2019 
 
 
Panel C.  Sovereign CDS momentum returns in subsamples (%) 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1-P5 
 (high)    (low)  
2001-2007  0.30* 0.11 0.00 -0.00 -0.23 0.54** 
 (1.85) (1.50) (0.18) (-0.21) (-0.80) (2.54) 
2008-2015 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.39 0.61** 
 (1.05) (0.38) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-1.20) (2.16) 
Developed 0.11 0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.29 0.41** 
 (1.40) (0.45) (-0.02) (0.31) (-1.45) (2.29) 
Developing 0.32 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.35 0.66** 
 (1.53) (0.68) (0.81) (0.47) (-1.08) (2.32) 
 
 
Panel D. Momentum alphas (%): n-month sorting period, h-month holding period  
 
n=1 n=3 n=6 
h=1 0.46***  0.55***  0.45***  
 
(2.67) (3.20) (2.81) 
h=3 0.39*** 0.37***  0.38***  
 (3.67) (3.04) (3.28) 
h=6 0.26*** 0.25** 0.20* 
 
(3.15) (2.47) (1.82) 
h=9 0.12* 0.15* 0.11 
 (1.85) (1.68) (1.06) 
h=12 0.08 0.13 0.13 
 (1.17) (1.61) (1.32) 
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Panel E.  Momentum returns through business cycles (%) 
 Recession Non-recession Difference 
MOM(1,1) 1.38 0.31 1.07** 
   (2.37) 
MOM(3,1) 1.43 0.41 1.02** 
   (2.24) 
MOM(6,1) 1.71 0.25 1.47*** 
   (3.14) 
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Table 3. The timing of predictability 
This table reports results from panel regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t, the sovereign CDS return 
of country i in month t. Ii,t-1 is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting based on sovereign 
CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1; is -1 if country i is in quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other 
three quintiles. Di,t is 1 if Standard & Poor’s announced a credit rating change or outlook change for 
country i in month t, and 0 otherwise. I_Goodi,t-1 (I_Badi,t-1) is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 (5) according 
to the sorting based on sovereign CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics, in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered by month. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Timing of predictability 
  Return (%)  Return (%) 
Ii,t-1 0.21**  0.10 
 
(2.47)  (1.31) 
Ii,t-1×Di,t   1.42*** 
 
  (3.24) 
Di,t   -0.77*** 
 
  (2.97) 
 
  
 Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Observations 10,168  10,168 
R-squared 0.12  0.13 
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Panel B: Good vs. bad news 
  Return (%)  Return (%) 
I_Goodi,t-1 0.24**  0.21** 
 
(2.38)  (2.02) 
I_Goodi,t-1×Di,t   0.23 
 
  (0.58) 
I_Badi,t-1 -0.18*  0.00 
 
(1.78)  (0.00) 
I_Badi,t-1×Di,t   -2.59*** 
 
  (3.18) 
Di,t   -0.17 
 
  (1.08) 
 
  
 Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Observations 10,168  10,168 
R-squared 0.12  0.13 
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Table 4. Global vs. Country-specific 
Panel A reports the returns of portfolios, which are sorted based on the global component of sovereign 
CDS returns (row 1), the country-specific component (row 2), and the total return (row 3). The CDS 
return decomposition is based on a 12-month rolling window regression of CDS returns on the average 
CDS returns across all countries in our sample. The regression residual is the country-specific component 
and the remaining portion of the CDS return is the global component. Since we need 12-month data to 
estimate the regressions, the sample period of the portfolio returns is January 2002 to September 2015. 
Countries are sorted into 5 quintiles. Quintile 1 (5) countries have highest (lowest) returns. Then, for each 
quintile, we form an equal weighted portfolio of sovereign CDSs and compute its return for the next 
month. Panel A reports the average return for each of the portfolios, and for the long-short portfolio that is 
long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5. The “alpha” column reports the alpha of the long-short strategy 
after adjusting for MKT, VAL, and MOM, all of which are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. Panel 
B reports estimates of panel regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS of 
country i in month t. I_Globali,t-1 is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting based on the 
global component sovereign CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1, is set to -1 if country i is in quintile 5, 
and is set to 0 if country i is in the other three quintiles. I_Countryi,t-1 is defined similarly based on the 
country-specific component. Di,t is 1 if Standard & Poor’s announced a credit rating change or outlook 
change for country i in month t, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
that are clustered by month. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Portfolio returns (%) 
Sorting variable P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1-P5 alpha 
  (high) 
   
(low) 
  Global 0.25 0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.19 0.44*** 0.44*** 
 
(1.63) (0.95) (0.18) (-0.48) (-0.94) (2.64) (2.65) 
Country-specific 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.12 0.30** 0.30** 
 
(1.08) (0.27) (0.07) (0.73) (-0.53) (2.00) (2.06) 
Total 0.25* 0.06 0.01 -0.00 -0.27 0.52*** 0.52*** 
  (1.94) (0.82) (0.11) (-0.01) (-1.37) (3.21) (3.25) 
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Panel B: Sovereign CDS return (%) 
  Return  Return 
I_Globali,t-1 0.22**  0.16* 
 (2.25)  (1.84) 
I_Countryi,t-1 0.14**  0.02 
 (2.25)  (0.36) 
I_Globali,t-1×Di,t   0.64 
   (1.31) 
I_Countryi,t-1×Di,t   1.42*** 
   (3.30) 
Di,t   0.58** 
 
  (2.46) 
 
  
 Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Observations 9,892  9,892 
R-squared 0.17  0.18 
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Table 5. Time-series Momentum 
Countries are sorted into two groups based on their past n-month sovereign CDS returns. Group 1 consists 
of countries with negative sovereign CDS returns while group 2 consists of countries with positive ones. 
Then, we form an equal-weighted portfolio that is long in sovereign CDSs on group-2 countries and short 
in those on group-1 countries. These portfolios are held for h months before rebalancing. This table 
reports average monthly returns from this time series momentum strategy. T-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Time series momentum returns (%)  
 
n=1 n=3 n=6 n=9 n=12 
h=1 0.20** 0.19***  0.23*** 0.13** 0.08 
 
(2.53) (2.93) (2.66) (2.22) (1.33) 
h=3 0.15*** 0.11** 0.10***  0.09 0.06 
 
(3.12) (2.26) (2.61) (1.49) (1.02) 
h=6 0.07*** 0.06* 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 
(2.93) (1.88) (1.29) (0.82) (0.56) 
h=9 0.04* 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
(1.69) (1.30) (0.99) (0.58) (0.40) 
h=12 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
 
(1.50) (1.41) (0.91) (0.44) (0.25) 
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Figure 1. Cumulative monthly returns during recession  
This figure plots cumulative returns from three cross-sectional momentum strategies. MOM(6,1) is the 
strategy with a 6-month sorting period and a 1-month holding period. MOM(3,1) and MOM(1,1) are 
defined similarly. Details of the strategies are described in Table 2. Shaded areas correspond to two 
NBER recessions from March 2001 to November 2001 and from December 2007 to June 2009.  
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Figure 2. Sovereign CDS momentum alphas 
The figure plots the alpha cumulated during the holding period of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy, 
described in Table 2, against the holding period. All strategies have a 3-month sorting period. All alphas 
are after controlling for MKT, VAL, and MOM, all of which are defined in Table 2.  
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Appendix: The list of countries with sovereign CDS contracts  
Country Starting time of CDS data Country Starting time of CDS data 
Algeria Sep-2008 Lebanon Apr-2003 
Angola Oct-2009 Lithuania May-2002 
Argentina Apr-2001 Malaysia May-2001 
Austria Jul-2001 Malta Aug-2004 
Australia Oct-2003 Macedonia Oct-2011 
Barbados Jul-2006 Mexico Feb-2001 
Belgium Mar-2001 Morocco May-2001 
Bulgaria May-2001 Netherlands Sep-2003 
Bahrain Aug-2004 Nigeria Jan-2007 
Belize Jan-2010 Norway Nov-2003 
Brazil Feb-2001 New Zealand Jan-2004 
Tunisia Dec-2003 Oman Dec-2008 
Canada Oct-2003 Pakistan Aug-2004 
Chile Mar-2002 Panama Mar-2002 
China Feb-2001 Peru Mar-2002 
Hong Kong Sep-2004 Philippines Apr-2001 
Colombia Apr-2001 Poland Feb-2001 
Costa Rica Sep-2003 Portugal Mar-2002 
Croatia Feb-2001 Qatar Oct-2001 
Cyprus Aug-2002 Hungary Apr-2001 
Czech Apr-2001 Georgia Jul-2015 
Germany Nov-2002 Romania Apr-2002 
Denmark Dec-2002 Ghana Jun-2008 
Dominica Aug-2003 Russia Oct-2001 
Ecuador Jul-2003 Saudi Arabia Mar-2007 
Egypt Apr-2002 Singapore Aug-2003 
El Salvador Jul-2003 Slovakia Jun-2001 
Estonia Jul-2004 Slovenia Mar-2002 
Fiji Jul-2007 South Africa Feb-2001 
Finland Aug-2002 Spain Mar-2001 
France May-2002 Serbia Jul-2006 
Greece Feb-2001 Sri Lanka Jan-2008 
Guatemala Sep-2003 Sweden Jul-2001 
Iceland Apr-2004 Switzerland Jul-2007 
India Aug-2003 Taiwan Sep-2006 
Indonesia Jan-2002 Thailand Apr-2001 
Iraq Mar-2006 Trinidad and Tobago Dec-2004 
Ireland Feb-2003 Turkey Feb-2001 
Israel May-2001 UAE Mar-2007 
Italy Mar-2001 United Kingdom Apr-2006 
Jamaica Oct-2003 Ukraine Oct-2002 
Japan Feb-2001 Uruguay Jun-2002 
Jordan Oct-2003 US Jan-2004 
Kazakhstan Feb-2004 Venezuela Mar-2001 
South Korea May-2001 Vietnam Sep-2002 
Latvia Sep-2004   
 
